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Using Family Partnerships and Refuting IRS Challenges
I.

Introduction
This article intends to highlight the AICPA's position concerning the legitimate
use of family partnerships. In particular, the AICPA takes exception with the
Internal Revenue Service's ("Service's") refusal to recognize for transfer tax
purposes the validity of many family partnership's under examination. In
setting a framework for this discussion, we will examine the development of
the family partnership as well as the major cases and laws which have focused
on their transfer tax ramifications. We will then discuss the Service's current
position, where it is appropriate and how it is being used to discourage
practitioners from using the family partnership structure. Finally, we will rebut
the technical basis for the Service's blanket challenge to family partnerships
and suggest some guidelines for structuring family partnerships to minimize the
potential for IRS challenge.

II.

Historical Development of Family Partnerships
The use of family partnerships started back in the mid-1960s but really became
popular in the mid-1970s. Prior to then, business and investment assets were
held largely in corporations rather than partnerships. This was largely due to
two factors. First, the law governing the formation and operation of
corporations as compared to partnerships is far better understood by most
attorneys. To a limited extent, this remains true today. Thus, absent other
compelling reasons, a client's attorney typically urged the formation of a
corporation rather than a partnership. Second, corporate income tax rates were
significantly less than individual rates making the corporate structure the
preferred structure for income tax deferral. Beginning in 1976, the spread
between individual and corporate income tax rates narrowed markedly making
partnerships and single level taxation far more attractive. Of equal significance,
the 1986 Act brought the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine and eliminated
the ability to liquidate a corporation tax free and avoid double level taxation.
After 1986, the clearly preferred choice of entity for holding any business or
investment became the limited partnership if for no other reason than income
tax considerations. The adoption of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act by
most states made the laws governing limited partnerships doing business in

multiple states relatively similar and understandable. In addition, to their single
level income taxation, limited partnerships are attractive entities because of:
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limited liability for most partners, particularly if the sole general partner
is a corporation;
very flexible equity structure;
both formation and liquidation is largely tax-free;
individual owners can be redeemed largely tax-free;
partnerships terms and provisions are flexible and can be changed by the
partners as circumstances change;
limited partnerships serve as trust substitutes;
limited partnerships provide significant creditor protection. Limited
partnership interests are seldom attached; they only provide creditors the
limited right of an assignee;
limited partnership interests are attractive assets to gift since they are
generally excluded from consideration in marital settlements and the
ease with which they can be transferred;
use of limited partnerships avoid multi-state probate if real estate is
owned in more than one jurisdiction;
avoid division of assets upon death of the holder of the partnership
interest;
allows synergies in the management of the partnership's assets which are
achievable only by consolidating financial wealth in one large common
pot;
maintain family control of assets held by the partnership;
minimal capital requirement; and
partnerships are generally not subject to state franchise taxes.

There are numerous other reasons for combining and holding business and
investment assets in a limited partnership.
One offsetting feature of a limited partnership to its holders is the fair market
value of the underlying assets may be greater than the fair market value of the
corresponding partnership interests. This is a clear negative to holding assets in
partnership solution, particularly if the individual must rely on their personal
balance in order to obtain credit. However, from a transfer tax perspective, the
dampening of value is advantageous. This reduction in the value of the limited
interests is largely due to the existence of marketability and minority interest
discounts which exist when a limited partnership interest is valued in the
marketplace. Since the standard for valuing property in general for both gift
and estate tax purposes is the value that property would be sold between an
arms-length buyer and seller, neither being under a compulsion to sell or buy,

and both with a reasonable knowledge of the underlying facts. It is also critical
to note that for transfer tax purposes fair market value is the price at which
property would be sold to a hypothetical third party, not a strategic buyer or an
individual who would gain voting control by the acquisition of the transferred
interest. Moreover, there is nothing wrong with holding assets in a partnership
rather than owning them directly, even though the former will almost in every
instance, produce a lower transfer tax value. In addition to income tax and
transfer tax considerations, partnerships possess numerous other nontax
characteristics which make them ideal structures for holding wealth whether
active or passive, and for transferring partial interests in that same wealth to
other individuals.
Over the years, the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Treasury have long
opposed the existence of large discounts in valuing limited partnership interests
in the context of the transfers between family members. Throughout the '70s
and '80s this opposition was focused on disallowing minority interest discounts
in all transfers between family members where the family possessed effective
control of the underlying limited partnership. The underlying theory espoused
by the government was that all members of the family would act in concert;
thus, each member of the family would be deemed to have the benefit of voting
control with respect to the underlying limited partnership, thereby making each
family transferor or transferee a controlling partner of the partnership. The
government would deny most minority discounts with respect to the transfer of
closely held limited partnership interests. This theory has been extensively
litigated. Among the cases dealing with this issue are Estate of Bright v. U.S.,
658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir., 1981); Estate of Andrews v. Comm., 79 TC 938
(1982); Ward v. Comm., 87 TC 78 (1986); Popstra v. U.S., 680 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir., 1982); Estate of Lee v. Comm., 69 TC 60 (1978), nonacq. 1980-2 CB 2.
Finally, after repeatedly raising this argument and losing, the Service in Rev.
Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 CB 202 acquiesced with the Courts' conclusion that
minority discounts in addition to marketability discounts were applicable in the
context of transfers of limited partnership interests between family members.
Having conceded the existence of a minority discount in the context of an
interfamily transfer, partitioners generally believed the Service was left with
litigating the magnitude of such discount.
Concurrent with these valuation challenges, the Service was also attacking two
uses of family limited partnerships which were tailored to cap or reduce the
transfer tax of the senior generation. In Estate of John G. Boykin, 53 TCM 345
(1987), the government attempted to challenge the classic estate freeze1 by
arguing that the retention of deferred income interest is tantamount to the

retention of a proportionate share of corporate income, thereby requiring
inclusion of the entire business in the estate of holder of the preferred interest.
(This technique was available to both partnerships and corporations.) The Court
ruled in favor of the taxpayer and against the Service, noting that the rights of
shareholders to receive dividends are established by the corporate documents
that govern the rights of the shares under applicable state law. Shareholders
were not entitled to any dividends except to the extent the company's board of
directors approved the payment of dividends. Since the decedent possessed no
voting control, the underlying value of the corporation was not included in the
decedent's estate. The principle is equally applicable to limited partnerships.
The Service also challenged the taxpayer's failure to exercise a conversion right
from a noncumulative, relatively low yielding preferred to a common stock
interest in Elizabeth W. Snyder, 93 TC 529 (1989). In this particular case, the
taxpayer created a freeze structure with a noncumulative preferred interest
which was convertible into common stock. While the corporation generated
little cashflow, its underlying assets appreciated significantly. The government
asserted that the taxpayer should have exercised their conversion rights and
exchanged the preferred interest for a common interest, and imputed a gift to
the extent that having done so would have enhanced the value of the senior
generation's equity position. The Court refused to extend the principles
of Dickman v. U.S., 465 U.S. 30 (1984), and equate the failure to convert a
noncurrently yielding preferred interest to a common equity interest when the
children hold common equity interests to failing to charge interest on loans to
your family. The Court rightly refused to substitute its judgment concerning
whether to exercise a conversion right for the sound business judgment of the
taxpayer and ruled against the Service.
In addition to attacking the freeze transaction, the Service also attempted to
attack the use of lapsing liquidation rights. In Harrison v. Comm., 52 T.C.M.
1306 (1987), the government challenged a valuation of a taxpayer's limited
partnership interest which as of the moment of death was illiquid,
nonmarketable and could not be put back to the partnership. The taxpayer
possessed a very large limited partnership interest and a small general
partnership interest. The partnership was formed a few months prior to the
taxpayer's death. While the taxpayer was alive, the taxpayer as a general partner
could liquidate the partnership. However, under state law, upon death, the
taxpayer ceased to be a general partner and could require only its general
partnership interest to be redeemed by the partnership. While the taxpayer was
alive, he could control the liquidation of both the general and limited
partnership interest; however, at death, only the very small general partnership
interest was liquid. The government argued that the liquidation rights and the

related value which existed upon formation of the partnership but disappeared
upon the taxpayer's death, should not escape taxation but should be included in
the value of the taxpayer's estate. The Court disagreed with the Service and
noted that the estate tax applies only to property whose value is determined at
the moment of death and passes from the decedent's estate to its intended
beneficiaries. In Harrison, the partnership interest was illiquid and
nonmarketable at the moment of death.
III.

Chapter 14
After a seemingly unbroken stream of judicial setbacks, Treasury and the
Service decided to turn to legislation to cure what they perceived to be were
abusive corporate and partnership structures from a transfer tax perspective.
Congress, in 1990, enacted Chapter 14 of the Code, introducing §§ 2701-2704.
Their structure and intent is relatively simple. Section 2701 is entitled, Special
Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of Certain Interests in Corporations or
Partnerships, § 2702 is entitled Special Valuation Rules in Case of Transfers of
Interests in Trusts; § 2703 is entitled, Certain Rights and Restrictions
Disregarded and, § 2704 is entitled, Treatment of Certain Lapsing Rights and
Restrictions. In general, the Senate Committee report describes the bill as
modifying, "the valuation of specifically retained rights in corporations and
partnerships; the valuation of split temporal interests in property; effect of
buy/sell agreements and options upon value; and the transfer tax consequences
of lapsing rights…" In other words, § 2701 is meant to repeal the results in
both Boykin and Snyder. Section 2703 was meant to deal with potential abuses
involving buy/sell agreements and options and § 2704 unabashedly attempted
to overturn the result in Harrison. What is of most significance is the legislative
history is void of any discussion of cases dealing with minority or marketability
discounts and, on more than one occasion, the legislative history specifically
states that the bill is not intended to effect minority or other discounts available
under existing law.

IV.

The Service's Current Assault on Discounts Applicable to Limited Partnership
Interests
Bolstered by their success in the Estate of Murphy v. Comm., TCM 1990-472
and Estate of Cidulka v. Comm., TCM 1996-149, the Service has effectively
made a policy decision to challenge the validity of closely-held partnerships for
transfer tax purposes. This has taken the form of potential litigation such
as Estate of Elaine Smith White v. Comm., Docket #14412-97,2 several letter
rulings have been issued denying discounts for transfers of limited partnership
interests, PLRs 9719006, 9723009, 9725002, 9725018, 9730004, 9735003,

9735043 and 9736004, and probably most troubling is a widespread audit
program among gift tax agents where no discounts are being accepted with
respect to the transfer of any closely-held partnership interest, with all
meaningful negotiations are directed to the national office of the IRS. There are
three broad theories for supporting the Service's current assault. The first is that
the formation of a closely-held partnership by definition runs afoul of § 2703.
Alternatively, the Service also argues that § 2704(b) will apply to the transfer.
Finally, if Chapter 14 does not produce the desired result, there is a final appeal
under the rationale of Estate of Murphy that the transfer of a partnership
interest rather than the underlying asset is merely a device for the transfer of
wealth to the natural objects of the transferor's bounty.
Section 2703 provides as follows:
"(a) General Rule - for purposes of this subtitle, the value of any
property shall be determined without regard to (1) any
option, agreement or other right to acquire or use the property at a price
less than the fair market value of the property, or (2) any restriction on
the right to sell or use the property."
The Service interprets this Code section to say that the typical family
partnership, in and of itself, is a restriction on the right of the owners to sell or
use the value of the underlying property held by the partnership or, conversely,
is an "agreement" limiting the ability of the partners to acquire or use the
partnership's underlying property at a price less than the fair market value. In
support of this position, the Service quotes the Senate Committee reports to the
1990 Act which created Chapter 14. In particular, in language related to § 2703,
they rely on the following sentences; "these requirements apply to any
restriction, however created. For example, they apply to restrictions explicit in
a capital structure of the partnership or contained in a partnership agreement,
articles of incorporation or corporate bylaws or a shareholder's agreement." The
Service makes the simple argument that to the extent a partner, whether limited
or general, is precluded from accessing their proportionate of the underlying
assets of the partnership or may only do so at a discount to the fair market value
of the underlying assets the Service argues that § 2703 applies. They argue that
unless the partnership can meet the requirements of 2703(b), the terms of the
partnership is to be ignored for valuation purposes and the value of the
partnership interest is merely that partner's proportionate share of the
underlying assets.
Section 2703(b) provides that § 2703(a) shall not apply to any option
agreement, right or restriction which meets three requirements: (1) it is a

bonafide business arrangement, (2) it is not a device to transfer property to
members of a decedent's family for less than full and adequate consideration or
money's worth, and (3) its terms are comparable to similar arrangements
entered into by person's in an arms-length transaction. The first two elements of
2703(b) were merely codification of existing law.
The third prong was added ostensibly to support the holding of St. Louis
County Bank v. U.S., 647 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1982). In most instances the
taxpayer can never meet this third prong. The IRS claims that it is extremely
unusual for taxpayers to transfer property into partnerships with unrelated
parties in which their ability to sell, pledge, encumber or otherwise transfer the
interest is absolutely prohibited. Nor do they believe that the vast majority of
most agreements include a prohibition against the putting of a partnership
interest back to the partnership. Even if such terms and provisions in
partnership agreements exist in partnerships which are arms-length, the Service
argues that such provisions are not similar arrangements. The Service states
that in the context of the family partnership area, these partnerships contain the
vast majority of the transferor's lifetime accumulation of assets and, thereby,
the transferor irrevocably forfeits the exclusive rights to unilaterally decide to
liquidate, exchange, gift presently received income and gains generated by the
assets and to derive benefits from the present possession and enjoyment. The
Service argues that persons who are not related do not transfer virtually all their
wealth to a partnership under an agreement with unrelated parties that makes it
impossible for them to reach those assets or the equivalent of those assets in
money or money's worth. While people have been known to transfer a portion
of their wealth to such investments with similar liquidation restrictions, nobody
puts all of their wealth irrevocably under the control of unrelated persons. (I'm
sure trusts companies would beg to differ.) The Service uses this as conclusive
evidence that the taxpayer cannot meet the third prong of § 2703(b).
The Service also argues that the taxpayer cannot meet the second prong; that
the formation of the partnership is merely a device with which to transfer the
value of the partnership's assets to the younger generation for less than full and
adequate consideration. The Service cites declarations by taxpayers stating that
one of the reasons for using a partnership is the fact that it makes it easy to
begin making gifts to their children and grandchildren. Therefore, the formation
of the partnership was a device from the beginning for the purpose of
transferring the donor's wealth to their natural beneficiaries. This argument
makes little sense. As discussed earlier, one of the attractive features of the
limited partnership structure was that children and grandchildren would be
obtaining a relatively illiquid asset which did not necessarily produce

significant cashflow. Most donors are particularly concerned about spoiling
younger family members with large gifts of cash or other liquid assets.
Converting such assets into an illiquid form prior to gifting is obviously
desirable. Moreover, the partnership format is far more desirable for gifting
purposes than transfers of partial interests in real estate or other business assets.
It is impractical and costly to make small transfers of real estate or other assets
which must be rerecorded upon each successive transfer.
In the event the Service loses under § 2703, it would then argue that § 2704
would apply in most instances, preventing most of the discount in the valuation
of partnership interests. Section 2704, in general, addresses perceived abuses
related to the existence of lapsing rights which reduce the transfer tax value of a
partnership interest and certain restrictions on the partnership's ability to
liquidate. Section 2704(a) attempts to reverse the Harrison decision. If there is a
lapse of any voting or liquidation right in a corporation or partnership and the
individual holding such right immediately before the lapse and members of
such individual's family hold both before and after the lapse control the entity,
then the lapse of the right shall be treated as a transfer by gift or a transfer
includable in the gross estate of the decedent, whichever is applicable. Thus, if
a partner had the ability to liquidate all or part of his or her interest during life,
and upon that partner's death their ability to liquidate any portion of the
partnership interest of that partner diminished, a lapse would occur. Arguably,
this reversed the result in Harrison. Section 2704(a) does not apply to the lapse
of a liquidation right under certain circumstances. Specifically, under Treas.
Reg. § 25.2704-1(c)(B), "whether an interest can be liquidated immediately
after the lapse is determined under the state law applicable to the entity, as
modified by the governing instrument of the entity, but without regard to any
restriction described in 2704(b)." The regulations define a lapse of a voting
right or liquidation right as follows: "a lapse of voting right or liquidation right
occurs at the time the presently exercisable right is eliminated." Generally, a
transfer of an interest that results in the lapse of a liquidation right is not treated
as a lapse if the rights with respect to the transferred interest are not restricted
or eliminated. Treas. Reg. § 25.2704-1(c). Thus, the transfer of a minority
interest in a corporation or partnership by the controlling shareholder or partner
by definition is not a lapse of voting rights nor is it typically a lapse of
liquidation rights as long as a general partnership interest is not being
transferred and the transferor retains his ability to liquidate his remaining
ownership interests.
Section 2704(b) was meant to address abusive restrictions which resulted in the
"excessive" discounting of lifetime transfers of interest in a corporation or a

partnership. In general, it provides that to the extent there has been a transfer of
an interest in a corporation or a partnership to a member of the transferor's
family and the transferor and members of the transferor's family hold, both
before and after the transfer, control of the entity, any applicable restriction
may be disregarded in determining the value of the transferred interest. An
applicable restriction is defined to mean "any restriction which limits the ability
of a corporation or a partnership to liquidate and either lapses in whole or part
after the transfer or could be removed in whole or part by the transferor or any
member of the transferor's family acting either alone or collectively." Section
2704(b)(2). The Service also interprets the definition of an applicable
restriction to include restrictions on a partner's ability to transfer their interest
either to the partnership or others. The term applicable restriction does not
include any commercially reasonable restriction which arises as a part of any
financing by the corporation or partnership with a person who is not related to
the transferor or transferee or a member of the family of either, or to any
restriction imposed or required to be imposed under federal or state law. Thus,
in most jurisdictions in which the Uniform Limited Partnership Act serves as
the model, the Service would take the position that in valuing a lifetime transfer
of a limited partnership interest to a family member that any restriction on the
partner's ability to put that interest back to the partnership is an applicable
restriction and would be ignored for purposes of valuing that partnership
interest for gift tax purposes. Most state laws provide that if the partnership
agreement is silent concerning a partner's right to put their interest back to the
partnership, that a partner has the right to put their interest to the partnership
upon providing six months notice to that partnership. However, state laws vary
as to partner rights. While a partner, under most states' law where the
partnership agreement is silent, has a right to put their interest, it may only
entitle the partner to an undivided interest in partnership assets or subject that
partner to liability for damages caused to the partnership by exercising that
right. Those corollary issues may justify significant valuation discounts even
where a partner has the right to put their partnership interest.
Should it lose both arguments under §§ 2703 and 2704, then the Service has the
fallback position that either the formation of the partnership itself is a device to
transfer wealth to family members at a discounted value and should be properly
includable in the decedent's gross estate as occurred in Estate of Schauerhamer
v. Comm., T.C.M. 1997-242, or, alternatively, there was a gift to the younger
generation upon formation of the partnership to the extent that the older
generation received partnership interests worth less than the assets they
contributed, albeit proportionate in value to the partnership interests received
by all partners. The Service would argue that under Schauerhamer as well

as Estate of Murphy that transfers of partnership interests in close proximity to
death may be includable in the gross estate under § 2036 if they are either
poorly implemented and ignored as legal entities (as occurred in the case
of Schauerhamer) or occur so close to death that the partnership is merely a
device for discounting the value of the decedent's taxable estate as occurred in
the Estate of Murphy. The Service's argument is that because the creation
and/or transfer of the partnership coincides so closely with the date of the
decedent's death that, for all practical purposes, the Service does not believe
that the partnership was formed for any of the business purposes discussed
earlier but was formed solely to reduce the ultimate transfer tax liability for the
decedent. Accordingly, the Service asserts the assets should be included in the
taxpayer's estate under § 2036.
Using these multi-layered arguments, the Service has aggressively audited
numerous taxpayer's gift tax returns and threatened litigation in many instances.
Moreover, through the use of published and unpublished letter rulings, the
Service has attempted to dissuade only the most versed and skilled planners
from using family partnerships for their clients. The ultimate impact of these
policies has been to confuse taxpayers of more moderate means and curtail the
use of the limited partnership to those individuals with the more sophisticated
advisors. This has the unfortunate consequence of limiting the many benefits of
family partnerships to only those clients willing and financially able to contest
the IRS which, we are sure, is not the true intent of either Congress or the
Service.
V.

Rebuttal of the Service's Arguments Concerning Family Partnerships
The Service's initial position that under § 2703 the provisions of a partnership
agreement can be ignored for purposes of valuing the transfer of a partnership
interest in a closely-held partnership cannot be supported using traditional
statutory construction. The Senate report made it clear that the Chapter 14 did
not change the fundamental principles under §§ 2031 or 2511 for determining
fair market value. Specifically, that committee report stated "the bill does not
affect minority discounts or other discounts available under present law…." It
continued, "the bill does not affect the valuation of a gift of a partnership
interest if all interests in the partnership share equally in all items of income,
deductions, loss, and gain in the same proportion…." The Service may well
argue that this language is contained in the portion of committee report that
relates to § 2701 and, therefore, has no impact on § 2703. That, moreover, it
should not be read out of context of the provision within which it is found. In
general, we would agree. However, we would also note that the language
quoted by the Service in support of their position is from the joint committee

report related to restrictions covered in § 2704 and not § 2703 and, therefore,
would have no relevance or bearing with regard to § 2703. Moreover, the
language contained in the Senate committee report related to § 2703, which
was not materially modified by the committee report, is titled "Buy/Sell"
agreements. "The committee report discussing § 2703 then reads, "This bill
provides that the value of property for transfer tax purposes is determined
without regard to an option, agreement or other right to acquire or use the
property at less than fair market value or any restriction on the right to sell or
use such property, unless the option, agreement, right or restriction meet three
requirements." It then discusses the three requirements which are a part of §
2703. The committee reports dealing with this section conclude with the
statement, "the bill does not otherwise alter the requirements for giving weight
to a buy/sell agreement." For example, it leaves intact existing rules requiring
that an agreement have lifetime applicability in order to be binding on death. It
is clear that the committee report intends for § 2703 to address option
agreements, traditional buy/sell agreements between family members, and
similar agreements, and not partnership agreements.
The committee report is careful to note that in the context of an option or a
buy/sell right with respect to a partnership interest or an interest in a
corporation, that such restrictions or rights could be imbedded in the various
documents relating to the governing of the entity. If such provisions are
contained in a partnership agreement, the partnership is not ignored but merely
that clause of the partnership might be ignored. Nowhere in the context of the
committee report can it be imagined that Congress through the enactment of §
2703 intended to cause the existence of a partnership agreement to be
disregarded for valuation purposes. Nor does it equate a partnership agreement
to an option or buy/sell agreement. It is clear Congress intended § 2703 to
clarify and reaffirm the reasoning of St. Louis County Bank and reject
suggestions of other cases that the maintenance of family control standing
alone assures the absence of a device to transfer wealth in the context of a
traditional buy/sell agreement or variations thereon. Nothing more can be
inferred.
There is no discussion anywhere in the legislative history of § 2703 that it was
intended to override any other provision of the Code and, in particular, Code §
7701(a)(2). Code § 7701(a)(2) provides that for estate and gift tax purposes the
term, partnership, includes "a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or other
unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, operation, or venture is carried on, and which is
not, within the meaning of this title, a trust, or estate or corporation; and the

term 'partner' includes a member of such a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture,
or organization." Thus, neither § 7701(a)(2) or, for that matter, § 2703, suggest
that a validly formed partnership under state law should be ignored for gift or
estate tax purposes. If the partnership is recognized as validly formed for
transfer tax purposes, then the property with which § 2703(a) must be making
reference to is the transferred partnership interest and not the underlying
property of the partnership. No other statutory construction makes sense
particularly in the context with which Chapter 14 was enacted.
If through some perverse interpretation of the legislative history to § 2703 the
courts determine § 2703 did indeed amend § 7701(a)(2), then for the
partnership agreement not to be an agreement which restricts the owner's ability
to acquire or use the underlying property at a price less than fair market value,
the taxpayer must prove that the partnership agreement is (1) a bonafide
business arrangement, (2) not a device to transfer property to members of the
transferor's family for less than an adequate consideration, and (3) at the time
the partnership is formed, the terms of the partnership are comparable to similar
arrangements entered into by persons in an arms-length transaction. As long as
the partners respect the terms of the partnership, then the partnership should
meet the bonafide business arrangement requirement. As stated at the
beginning of this paper, there are numerous sound business reasons for forming
a partnership as well as the fact that it is clearly the most income tax efficient
structure for owning an investment or business. It is even the default entity
under § 7701(a)(2) and § 761 for situations when more than one legal entity
join together to form another entity. Thus, under the Code there is a
presumption that joint activities will be in the form of a partnership. Congress
obviously intended that partnerships be widely used and recognized for tax
purposes.
Under the second prong to the exception to § 2703, entering into the
partnership agreement by the transferor must be shown not to be a device to
transfer the property he contributed to the partnership to a family member for
less than full and adequate consideration. Thus, the taxpayer must prove that
either the drafting of the partnership agreement is not a device for transferring
wealth or that the transferor's family did not receive the full value of the
underlying assets. The device test is not new and has been argued consistently
by the Service under § 2031 in Estate of Bischoff v. Comm. 69 TC 32 (1977) as
well as in Harrison v. Comm. and Estate of McClendon v. Comm., 66 TCM
946 (1993). The Courts in each of these decisions determined that transfer
restrictions contained in partnership interests are not, in and of themselves,
devices artificially depressing the value of the transferred partnership interest.

The device test is fundamentally a question of whether transfer tax savings was
the primary motivation for forming the family partnership or were there other
valid income tax and/or business purposes for forming the partnership which at
least equal or exceed the transfer tax benefits of the partnership.
The facts of St. Louis County Bank were extreme. The buy/sell agreement
restrictions were ignored by the taxpayer's family with respect to lifetime
transfers to family members. Moreover, the buy/sell formula in the St. Louis
County Bank resulted in an unrealistic valuation of zero of the underlying asset.
Such extreme valuation formulas cannot be considered a typical business
arrangement. Unrealistically low valuation formulas create a strong implication
that the buy/sell agreement is a device to transfer wealth to the decedent's
family. With respect to most family partnerships, neither of these extreme sets
of facts are present. The key lesson of the St. Louis County Bank's opinion was
"the District Court concluded that the existence of a valid business purpose
necessarily excluded the possibility that the agreement was a tax- avoidance
testamentary device. We disagree. The fact of a valid business purpose could,
in some circumstances, completely negate the alleged existence of a tax
avoidance testamentary device as a matter of law, but those circumstances are
not necessarily presented here." The extreme valuation formula created a clear
implication in the Court's mind that the buy/sell agreement was a device to
transfer wealth to the decedent's family. In a typical family partnership, that
kind of fact pattern is simply not present. As long as the partnership remains in
existence for some period of time following either the death of the decedent or
transfer of the partnership interest, then the partnership agreement, in and of
itself, should not be considered a device. The maintenance of partnership for an
extended period of time supports the taxpayer's position that the partnership
was formed for valid business purposes in addition to the favorable tax
attributes.
Although not needed, the second part of § 2703(b)(2) could also be met by
most taxpayers. In most instances, what a transferee receives either through a
lifetime transfer or through a taxpayer's estate is not a right of a limited partner
or a general partner to receive the underlying asset value but is a right as an
assignee to the partnership interest. An assignee does not automatically become
a partner under most state law and most partnership agreements until the
partners of the partnership expressly admit the assignee as a partner to the
partnership. Typically, such admission can be withheld for any reason. Thus, it
would be impossible for the Service to argue that the underlying asset value has
been transferred to the transferor's family because all they received were the

rights of an assignee in most instances. The value of those rights, in many
cases, may be less than what the transferor had prior to the transfer.
The final prong to the exception to § 2703 requires that the taxpayer show that
the restrictions and terms of the partnership agreement are comparable to
similar arrangements entered into by persons in an arms-length transaction. The
regulations define a similar arrangement as one that could have been obtained
in an arms-length among unrelated parties in the same business dealing with
each other at arms-length. A right or restriction is considered a bargained for
restriction if it conforms to the general practice of unrelated parties under
negotiated agreements in the same business. Limitations on the ability of a
transferee to automatically be admitted to a partnership are found in most
partnership agreements and are the default provisions under most state laws.
Moreover, limitations on a partner's ability to sell or redeem their partnership
interest are not unusual any time multiple entities join together in a common
endeavor. This is necessary to protect all partners from the costs of maintaining
high levels of liquidity or the inopportune sale of illiquid assets. However, the
trend in many states is to restrict the ability of a limited partner to put their
interest as the default provision under state law. In those states it cannot be
argued that restrictions prohibiting the exercise of such put rights are not
typical or common. Even if such limitations were not deemed to be present in
similar arrangements among unrelated parties, then the partnership agreement
itself would not be ignored in its entirety but merely that clause of the
partnership agreement. The property being transferred is still a partnership
interest. To the extent that the partnership has other restrictions or limitations
on a partner's ability to monetize their interest, those terms would still have a
depressing impact on the value of that interest. The asset to which § 2703 is to
apply, if at all, is still a partnership interest because economically and legally
that is all that the recipient received. Its valuation at worst will be determined
under the § 2703 modified partnership agreement.
In any event, withdrawal rights and most other partner rights under most state
laws are limited to limited partners and are not extended to assignees. Thus, the
transferee in most instances would not have the right to put their interest under
state law until they became a partner. As previously discussed, the right to
become a partner is not mandated under state law and is problematic at best. In
conclusion with respect to § 2703, it should not be construed as to apply to
modify the definition of a partnership for transfer tax purposes under §
7701(a)(2) but should be interpreted in the context of buy/sell arrangements
and option agreements. Even if § 2703 were to be applied to every partnership
agreement per se, most family partnerships should be able to meet the three

pronged requirements under 2703(b) to be excepted from the application of §
2703(a).
The applicability of § 2704(a) and (b) is also not likely or appropriate. In the
context of 2704, the issue is whether there has been a lapse of any liquidation
or voting right held by the decedent. This arguably arises if the decedent holds
either a limited partnership interest or both a general and limited partnership
interest. As discussed previously, under most state laws the transferee of a
general partnership interest or a limited partnership interest only receives the
rights of an assignee and is not elevated to those of a partner absent the
remaining partners consenting to the assignee being admitted to the partnership.
Therefore, in the context of the death of a limited partner is there a lapse
associated with that limited partnership interest which occurs when the
successor of that limited partnership interest only has the rights of an assignee?
Arguably, there has been some lapse but as a practical matter, there has been no
lapse of any measurable value because under the willing buyer/willing seller
test of Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), a third party hypothetical acquirer of such
interest would realize that he was only obtaining the rights with respect to that
partnership interest as an assignee and not as a limited partner. Therefore, the
valuation of a typical limited partnership interest both before and after any
transfer should not be materially different and should approximate the value of
an assignee interest. Hence, no lapse in value occurs, merely due to a transfer
even at death.
In the context of the situation where the decedent has both a general and limited
partnership interests, the issue is a little more complex. As previously noted, §
2704(a) does not apply to a lapse of a liquidation right where the lapse would
be disregarded under § 2704(b). Under Treas. Reg. 25.2704-1(c)(2)(b),
"whether an interest can be liquidated immediately after the lapse is determined
under the state law generally applicable to the entity, as modified by the
governing instruments of the entity, but without regard to any restriction
described in § 2704(b)." Thus, under most state laws, a limited partnership
interest cannot be liquidated except as provided under state law and only
assignee rights can be transferred. Most general partnership interests can be
redeemed under state law by the partnership; however, that would not terminate
the partnership unless the decedent was the sole general partner of the
partnership. Thus, in most instances, § 2704(a) would once more have only
limited applicability. It arguably would apply only to the extent a partner lost
the ability to put their general partnership interest, but would still have no
impact on the valuation of their limited partnership interest.

With respect to most pro rata limited partnerships, § 2704(b)is not applicable to
transfers of limited partnership interests to a family member for a number of
reasons. First, an applicable restriction is defined under the Code to mean "any
restriction (a) which limits the ability of the corporation or partnership to
liquidate and (b) with respect to which either of the following applies, (1) the
restriction lapses in whole or in part after the transfer of the interest or (2) the
transferor or a member of the transferor's family either alone or collectively has
the right to ask for the removal in whole or part of the restriction." §
2704(b)(2). The Service takes the position that limitations on limited partners'
ability to put their interest back to the partnership is a restriction under 2704(b)
and should be ignored for valuation purposes. First of all, this is an invalid
statutory interpretation. The Code's definition of an applicable restriction refers
only to the corporation's or partnership's ability to liquidate. An application
restriction, as defined in § 2704, has nothing to do with a shareholder's or
partner's ability to sell their interest or have it redeemed by the entity. The fact
that a partnership agreement may prohibit the putting of a partnership interest
back to a partnership or the withdrawal of a partner has no bearing on the
partnership's ability to liquidate. No other interpretation is possible based on
the clear understanding of the statute. As stated earlier, the growing trend in
many states is to change the applicable state partnership law to eliminate the
right of any partner to put their interest back to the partnership. With respect to
those states, which include Delaware, Georgia, California, Mississippi, New
York, Missouri, Ohio, among others) § 2704(b) could never apply to
restrictions on the ability of the partner to put their interest back to the
partnership. Moreover, partnerships can be formed anywhere using the state
law of another jurisdiction. Thus, arguably, given appropriate planning,
2704(b) would never apply even if the Service's interpretation of the section is
upheld.
Even if a state's law does provide the right of a limited partner to put their
interest and the Service's interpretation of 2704(b) is correct, ignoring the put
provision with respect to the limited partnership interest should have no impact
on the ultimate valuation of the limited partnership interest. That is because the
transferee receives only the rights of an assignee and, under most state laws, an
assignee has no right to sell their interest to the partnership. Thus, even if the
partnership agreement was read so as not to limit the right of the limited partner
to put their interest back to the partnership, the gift tax value of that partnership
interest would still not vary significantly from that of an assignee interest
regardless of whether § 2704(b) applied. This is further supported by the fact
that even if the limited partner put their interest back to the partnership, they
would only be entitled to receive "fair value" on their withdrawal. As discussed

earlier, it would be unclear what fair value would be and what kind of
consequential damages would occur due to a "unanticipated, premature"
withdrawal by a limited partner from a partnership. Moreover, an assignee
would never posses this right. Once more, it should also be noted that § 2704(b)
does not contemplate the abolition of normal discounting principles. The
conference committee report stated "these rules do not affect minority
discounts or other discounts available under present law." If § 2704(b) were to
apply potentially to any entity that did not have a perpetual life (i.e., all entities
other than corporations) due to limited partner put rights, then that would
completely denude the legislative history of its clear meaning. Section 2704(b)
cannot be read in context to mean that it precludes the availability of normal
discounts to partnerships but not to corporations. It is our understanding that
under most state laws, shareholders possess no put rights with respect to their
shares. Clearly, § 2704(b) was not intended to be applied in a manner which
only impacts the value of partnership interests and not corporate stock.
This leaves the Service with the less attractive arguments that the formation of
a partnership itself was either a sham or a device under the principles
of Schauerhamer and Murphy. As discussed previously, Estate of
Bischoff, Estate of Harrison, and Estate of McClendon have all held that the
family partnership structure does not violate the device test under the
regulations under § 2031. Moreover, the Service has repeatedly ruled that the
transfer of a limited partnership and retention of a general partnership interest
does not violate IRS § 2036(a)(2) or § 2038 under the principles of United
States v. Byrum, 408 US 125 (1972). Assuming the multiple purposes for the
creation of the partnership can be adequately documented and supported, there
should be no basis for asserting that the partnership is a device under § 2031.
Obviously, the partnership would need to have more than a temporal existence
and the terms of the partnership in its provisions would need to be respected.
Otherwise, the taxpayer would run risks under either § § 2031 or 2036.
However, in the typical partnership context, the partnership continues for a
considerable period of time beyond its initial formation serving several valid
purposes. In this normal fact pattern, the Service's arguments that the
partnership is a device ring hollow.
VI.

Charting a Course Through Troubled Waters
The Service's current attack on limited partnerships is merely a reflection of
their unofficial denial of the existence of Rev. Rul. 93-12 or the principles
espoused therein. However, their hope that Chapter 14 represented a legislative
overturning of Rev. Rul. 93-12 is misplaced. Until the Service and Treasury are
able to convince Congress to enact legislation contravening the principles of

93-12 and the underlying case law which is the foundation for Rev. Rul. 93-12,
the Service should abandon its policy of belligerence towards taxpayer's who
have made transfers of closely-held limited partnership interests, and their
rulings should treat discounts of such interests for transfer tax purposes in a
more even-handed manner.
In the meantime, taxpayers must make sure that the facts surrounding their use
of the limited partnership structure do not warrant IRS challenge. The
partnership must be entered into for valid business or investment purposes.
Such purposes should be documented. Wherever possible, one partner should
not be given the unilateral right to liquidate the partnership. Partnership
agreements should be drafted using state laws where § 2704(b) is moot. Rights
and powers of assignees should be no greater than those provided under state
law. Wherever possible, there should be more than one general partner. And,
finally, the transfer of a partnership interest should give the recipient only the
rights of an assignee under state law. If these principles are followed and the
partnership interest is not transient in existence, then there should be no valid
grounds for the Service to challenge the discounts found when valuing the
partnership interest in either a gift or estate tax context.
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